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SUMMARY 
 
In 2003 the European Commission introduced the Directive 2003/54/EC and Regulation 
1228/2003/EC which increased the focus on the liberalization of the European electricity 
market. The international electricity trade has increased and created new challenges related to 
cross-border transmission and compensation mechanisms.  
 
The focus of the report has been to discuss the development of the electricity market in 
Europe, and the status of international exchange. The report also discusses the concept of 
cross-border trade and transit, and investigates a proposed ITC model and whether correct 
investment incentives are given.   
 
Market development 
Price data from the main power exchanges in Europe indicate that the market is experiencing 
increasingly integration and efficiency. There has also been a trend towards market based 
congestion management methods. Regional markets have successfully developed in Spain and 
Portugal (the Iberian market) and between France, Belgium and The Netherlands (the 
Trilateral Market Coupling, TLC). Further plans for regional coupling are also underway (see 
chapter 5). 
 
Transit  
The most common definition of transit is the one adopted by ETSO (Association of European 
Transmission System Operators), where transit is defined as the minimum between exports 
and imports. This definition could create opportunities for market participants to manipulate 
transit income (discussed in chapter 5.3).  
 
Inter-TSO compensation model 
The Inter-TSO compensation (ITC) model used in this report is based on the With-and-
Without transit algorithm. The model only focuses on costs and load flow, and do not include 
market incentives or evaluation of benefits. The model bases the compensation calculation on 
the transit term, which can lead to misguided identification of network responsibility. 
 
Investment Incentives 
Two scenarios were compared with a base case scenario in order to identify possible 
investment incentives. The first scenario included a situation where one of the cross-border 
lines in the network was constrained. Results from this simulation indicate that the 
transmission system operators involved would experience increased ITC payment, and 
therefore not receive investment incentives. The TSOs involved would benefit from the 
bottleneck in form of increased revenue (assuming Cost-Of-Service regulation).  
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In the second scenario an extra cross-border line was implemented, and the situation was 
compared to the base case. The results from this simulation show that the TSOs involved 
would receive a positive effect in form of reduced ITC cost. The ITC mechanism would in 
this case be in line with the European Commission’s Regulation 1228/2003/EC, and give the 
involved TSOs correct investment incentives.  
The lack of correlated results in these two cases indicates that the ITC mechanism (in this 
case modeled by the WWT algorithm) cannot be regarded as relevant from an investment 
incentive perspective (more information found in chapter 7.3).  
  
IV 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. I 
SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. II 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... IV 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... VI 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... VII 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Background .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research objectives and methods ................................................................................ 1 
1.3  Structure of the report .................................................................................................. 1 
2. INTERNATIONAL POWER EXCHANGE ................................................................. 3 
2.1 Some viewpoints on an effective market ..................................................................... 3 
2.2 Regulatory Framework ................................................................................................ 4 
2.3 Congestion management in Europe ............................................................................. 5 
2.3.1 Overview .............................................................................................................. 5 
2.3.2 Market based solutions ......................................................................................... 7 
2.3.3 Non market based solutions ................................................................................. 8 
2.4 European Power Markets ........................................................................................... 10 
2.4.1 The exchange ...................................................................................................... 10 
2.4.2 European power exchanges ................................................................................ 11 
2.4.3 OTC trading in the power market ...................................................................... 14 
2.5 Market development .................................................................................................. 15 
2.5.1 Congestion management .................................................................................... 15 
2.5.2 Market Prices ...................................................................................................... 16 
2.5.3 Regional markets ................................................................................................ 17 
3. PRICING MECHANISM .............................................................................................. 18 
3.1 Properties of the electricity market ............................................................................ 18 
3.2 Pricing mechanism and congestion management ...................................................... 19 
3.2.1 Socio economic welfare ..................................................................................... 19 
3.2.2 A simple example ............................................................................................... 19 
4. INTER-TSO COMPENSATION .................................................................................. 22 
4.1  The ITC framework ................................................................................................... 22 
4.2 Comments to the framework ..................................................................................... 23 
4.3 General properties for a cost allocation method ........................................................ 24 
4.4 Voluntary agreement ................................................................................................. 25 
5. TRANSIT AND CROSS-BORDER FLOW ................................................................ 26 
V 
 
5.1 Tariff Regulation and ITC ......................................................................................... 26 
5.1.1 Cost elements ..................................................................................................... 26 
5.1.2 Revenue elements ............................................................................................... 27 
5.1.3 ITC and TSO profit ............................................................................................ 27 
5.2 General benefits and costs ......................................................................................... 28 
5.2.1 Cross-border trade .............................................................................................. 28 
5.2.2 Transit ................................................................................................................. 29 
5.3 Investment incentives ................................................................................................ 30 
5.3.1 Individual incentive ............................................................................................ 30 
5.3.2 Congestion rent incentive ................................................................................... 31 
5.3.3 ITC incentive ...................................................................................................... 31 
5.4 Loop Flow and transit ................................................................................................ 32 
6. THEORY ......................................................................................................................... 33 
6.1 Model for ITC allocation ........................................................................................... 33 
6.2 11-node grid ............................................................................................................... 36 
6.3 Optimal Power Flow and Nodal Prices ..................................................................... 38 
6.3.1 Generator costs ................................................................................................... 38 
6.3.2 Nodal Prices and the point-tariff system ............................................................ 38 
7. SIMULATION RESULTS ............................................................................................ 40 
7.1 Impact of a bottleneck ............................................................................................... 40 
7.1.1 Base case ............................................................................................................ 40 
7.1.2 Bottleneck ........................................................................................................... 46 
7.2 Additional cross-border transmission line ................................................................. 48 
7.3 Summing up results ................................................................................................... 50 
7.3.1 Bottleneck scenario ............................................................................................ 50 
7.3.2 Additional cross-border line ............................................................................... 51 
7.3.3 Potential weakness in the simulation ................................................................. 52 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 53 
8.1 Market development .................................................................................................. 53 
8.2 Evaluation of the model ............................................................................................. 53 
9. REFERENCE ................................................................................................................. 56 
APPENDIX 1 – ABBREVATIONS ...................................................................................... 59 
APPENDIX 2 – ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS ........................................................... 60 
A2.1 Bottleneck scenario calculations ............................................................................ 60 
A2.2 Additional cross-border line scenario calculations ................................................ 62 
 
  
VI 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 2.1  Different congestion management methods in Europe, year 2004   -5- 
   (ETSO, 2004) 
Figure 2.2  Different congestion management methods in Europe, year 2007   -6- 
  (ERGEG, 2007) 
Figure 2.3  Market based congestion management methods (Kristiansen, 2007)  -7- 
Figure 2.4  Non market based congestion management methods (Kristiansen, 2007)  -8-
Figure 2.5  Power exchanges in Europe (EEX & Powernext, 2008)   -11- 
Figure 2.6  Price development at various power exchanges during 2008  -16- 
   (OMEL, 2009) 
Figure 2.7 Strategies by the European Commission, year 2004    -17-
  (European Commission, 2004) 
Figure 3.1 Producer and consumer surplus in optimal market environment   -19-
  (Wangensteen, 2007) 
Figure 3.2 Demand and supply curves for the two areas (Wangensteen, 2007) -20- 
Figure 3.3 Supply and demand curves for the integrated market   -20- 
   (Wangensteen, 2007) 
Figure 3.4 Welfare gain/loss and congestion rent in a situation with constrained   -21-
  tranmssion capacity (Wangensteen, 2007) 
Figure 5.1 Example of transit flows through Country B    -30- 
Figure 5.2 Example of interconnector flow      -31- 
Figure 5.3 Loop flows in a network       -33- 
Figure 6.1 Base case grid (R. D. Christie, 2000)     -37- 
Figure 7.1 Base Case scenario with load flows      -41- 
Figure 7.2 Bottleneck scenario including load flows     -47- 
Figure 7.3 Additional 400 MW cross-border line scenario including load flows -49- 
  
VII 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 6.1 Line data for the base case       -38- 
Table 7.1 Network utlization Region 1 Base case, with transit   -43- 
Table 7.2 Network utlization Region 1 Base case , without transit   -43- 
Table 7.3 Compensation due to Region 1, Base case     -44- 
Table 7.4 Network utlization Region 2 Base case , without transit   -44- 
Table 7.5 Network utlization Region 2 Base case , without transit   -44- 
Table 7.6 Compensation due to Region 1, Base case     -45- 
Table 7.7 Contribution to the compesation pool, base case    -46- 
Table 7.8 Contribution to the compesation pool, Bottleneck case   -48- 
Table 7.9 Contribution to the compesation pool, additional cross-border line  -50- 
Table 7.10 Allocation of the cost when having a bottleneck in the grid   -51- 
Table 7.11 Comparison between Base Case and Bottleneck    -51- 
Table 7.12 Allocation of the cost when investing in a new cross-border line  -52- 
Table 7.13 Comparison between Base Case and Extra Line    -52- 
Table A.1 Network utlization Region 1 Bottleneck case, with transit   -60- 
Table A.2 Network utlization Region 1 Bottleneck case, without transit  -60- 
Table A.3 Compensation due to Region 1, Bottleneck case    -61- 
Table A.4 Network utlization Region 2 Bottleneck case, with transit   -61- 
Table A.5 Network utlization Region 2 Bottleneck case, without transit  -61- 
Table A.6 Compensation due to Region 2, Bottleneck case    -62- 
Table A.7 Network utlization Region 1 extra cross-border line case case, with transit-62- 
Table A.8 Network utlization Region 1 extra cross-border line case, without transit -63- 
Table A.9 Compensation due to Region 1, extra cross-border line case  -63- 
Table A.10 Network utlization Region 2 Bottleneck case, with transit   -63- 
Table A.11 Network utlization Region 2 extra cross-border line case, without transit -64- 
Table A.12 Compensation due to Region 2, extra cross-border line case  -64- 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The European power market is going through a process of liberalization. Powered by the 
Directive 2003/54/EC (European Commission, 2003a) and the Regulation 1228/2003/EC 
(European Commission, 2003b), the European Commission is seeking to create a competitive 
market for electricity trade in the enlarged European Union.   
 
1.2 Research objectives and methods 
 
The research objective for this report has been to give an overview of the development of the 
integration process in the European electricity market, with special emphasis on the 
international exchange between countries.  This power exchange between nations brings up 
many important issues that need to be addressed. Congestion management is one of these 
issues, and is by many considered to be the key in the integration process.  
 
Another subject of importance is the inter-TSO compensation mechanism which deals with 
transit flows as a consequence of cross-border trades. The transit flows are characterised by 
the fact that injections and loads are outside the transit country. The question of compensation 
for this kind of transit is subject to much discussion and different models have been 
developed.  
 
In this report the With-and-Without transit mechanism is discussed and closer investigated in 
order to identify some relationships between ITC allocation and investment incentives. An 
Optimal Power Flow algorithm is being used in the simulation process. This algorithm 
replicates an efficient market environment, and is in line with the ambition of the European 
Commission, where we preferable would have a situation with a single European power 
market.  
 
 
1.3  Structure of the report 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the European electricity market and the integration process 
started by the European Commission. The regulatory framework is commented and an 
overview of the congestion management methods is given. An overview of the main power 
exchanges in Europe is also given. The chapter ends with a discussion on the market 
development. 
 
The pricing mechanism in an electricity market is discussed in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 4 concentrates on the inter-TSO compensation concept, and the framework behind 
this mechanism. 
 
A general discussion about transit flows and cross-border flows is given in chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 6 introduces the reader to the theory related to the simulations done in the report.  
 
The results from the simulations are presented in chapter 7. These are based on a Base Case, a 
Bottleneck Case and an Additional cross-border line Case.  
 
A discussion and conclusion is presented in chapter 8. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL POWER EXCHANGE 
 
In this section some principles regarding international power exchange is discussed. With 
increased cross-border trade, congestions are likely to occur, a section in this chapter is set off 
to clarify the term congestion and discuss some of the methods utilized. The liberalization 
process also involves the power exchanges, and these are discussed in a later section. But first 
some viewpoints of an effective market should be mentioned.  
 
 
2.1 Some viewpoints on an effective market  
 
A well functioning and effective market is often characterized by several important attributes. 
First off is the ease of market entry and exit. It is important to avoid barriers of entry into the 
market as this would reduce the possibilities for participation, and thereby limit the extent of 
competition. Another sign of a well functioning market is the lack of significant monopoly 
power. This monopoly power restricts the participation opportunities of smaller entities and 
potential new market entrants. Furthermore is widespread availability of market information 
an essential part of an effective market, all parties in the market, including firms and 
consumers, must be well informed in order to make effective decisions.  
 
The above statements are some of the foundation in an effective and liquid market 
environment. When these criteria are taken into account, some viewpoints on an effective 
electricity market can be suggested. 
 
Ease of market entry  
Parties should have open access and equal rights in the transportation system. As discussed in 
(Melody, 2003) is the need for a transparent and non-discriminatory access to the grid urgent 
for competition and it has been a challenge so far to establish neutral and independent system 
operators which arrange for open access and equal rights for transmission.  
 
Lack of significant monopoly power 
No participant should have a dominating position, where its in it force of size can control the 
market.  
 
Widespread availability of market information 
It is important that information about relevant market conditions are accessible at all times. 
This would imply that the market participants, including the exchanges and the system 
operators must provide information to the market.  
 
In addition to these criteria, good market liquidity should be emphasized. This can be reached 
by having a sufficient number of participants on both supply and demand side. As the number 
of participants increase, the liquidity and confidence to the market price increases. One single 
large exchange should be favorable over a cluster of smaller exchanges as this would 
significantly increase the liquidity and transparency in the market.  
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2.2 Regulatory Framework 
 
The liberalization of the electricity market has been strongly enforced by the European 
Commission. The goal has been to create a competitive market for electricity in EU and the 
rest of Europe, where customers can have a choice of supplier and where unnecessary 
obstructions to cross border exchanges are removed. The improved cross-border flow, would 
according to their strategy paper, increase the competition and the efficiency in the market 
and lead to an overall increase in economic growth (European Commission, Strategy Paper, 
2004). 
 
In order to reach their goal of a more competitive market, the Directive 2003/54/EC was 
introduced. The Directive was concerning common rules for the Internal Electricity Market 
(IME), and was repealing Directive 96/92/EC, which did not reach the expected results.  The 
Directive 2003/54/EC has four main objectives, 
 
 
1. Strengthening access to the electricity transmission and distribution networks 
A nondiscriminatory access to the network is guaranteed, and thus eliminating the possibility 
of negotiated third party access (TPA), and only allowing the regulated TPA. This would 
assure all market operators a better right to access the network without discrimination.  
 
 
2. Increased level of consumer protection 
The Directive guarantees for an effective legal separation between market actors and 
operators working in the transmission and distribution, where the aim is to limit the risk of 
cross-subsidization and discrimination between current and new entrants.   
 
 
3. Strengthening independent regulation. 
The member states are obligated to establish an effective regulator, who has independence 
from the market operators. 
 
 
4. Accelerated market opening 
A timetable for the different market opening stages is given. The member states should ensure 
that non-household customers are free to purchase electricity from the suppliers of their 
choice by 1
st
 July 2004, and 1
st
 July 2007 for the non-household users (i.e. commercial, 
industrial and other professional customers). 
 
To address the increased cross-border exchange, the Regulation 1228/2003/EC
1
 was 
implemented. This regulation was aimed at setting rules for cross-border exchange of 
                                                 
1
 With the entry into force of the Regulation on the 1
st
 of July 2004, the first Guidelines on Congestion 
Management became legally binding and on the 1
st
 of December 2006, the amended Congestion Management 
Guidelines took legal effect.  
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electricity. In addition to this the Regulation established a framework for the Inter-TSO 
Compensation mechanism (ITC). This topic will be addressed later in the report.  
 
The framework suggested by the European Commission, in form of Directive 2003/54/EC and 
Regulation 1228/2003/EC seems fairly in line with the criteria for an effective market 
discussed in section 2.1, as well as the Commissions own agenda on the development of the 
Internal Energy Market (IEM).  
 
 
2.3 Congestion management in Europe 
 
The definition adopted by The European Commission is that congestion involves a situation 
where interconnectors, which link national transmission networks, cannot accommodate all 
physical flow that results from international trade. The congested transmission line should, 
according to the Regulation 1228/2003/EC, be managed in such a way that the transmission 
capacity is utilized efficiently with as little social welfare loss as possible.  
 
2.3.1 Overview  
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, were earlier solutions on the continent and the rest of Europe a 
complete mix of various systems. These solutions included methods like; access limitation, 
priority list, pro-rata, explicit auction, implicit auction, first come – first served and so forth. 
But as can be seen in Figure 2.2, is the situation today somewhat different. There seems to be 
a shift towards market based solutions like implicit and explicit auctions at most national 
borders.  
 
  
 
Figure 2.1  Different congestion management methods in Europe, year 2004 (ETSO, 2004) 
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Figure 2.2  Different congestion management methods in Europe, year 2007 (ERGEG, 2007) 
Explanation to Figure 2.2:    - Market splitting (Implicit Auction) has now been introduced in the Iberian 
    market  
-  An interconnection with more than two different colors means that there is 
 not a unique capacity allocation method or congestion management 
 mechanism jointly applied by the two TSOs involved 
-  The NorNed cable is not included in the figure, the plan is to introduce 
 market coupling on this connection  
 
The most attractive congestion management method in a well developed electricity market is 
a solution that encourages transparency and liquidity, the Regulation 1228/2003/EC Article 6, 
states the following: 
“Network congestion problems shall be addressed with non-discriminatory 
market based solutions which give efficient economic signals to the market 
participants and transmission system operators involved. Network 
congestion problems shall preferentially be solved with non transaction 
based methods, i.e. methods that do not involve a selection between the 
contracts of individual market participants” 
 
 (European Commission, 2003b). 
 
Even though a market based solution is the recommended solution, a range of non market 
based methods is still used in the allocation of transmission capacity throughout Europe. In 
the following section a selection of both market based and non market based solutions are 
described.  
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2.3.2 Market based solutions 
 
These are the preferred solutions in a marked based environment, they are transparent and 
non-discriminatory and give a correct economic signal provided there is no exercise of market 
power. A simple overview of the methods can be seen in Figure 2.3.  
In an explicit auction, transmission capacity is auctioned separately to the marketplace where 
trading of energy occurs. The TSO determines ex ante net transfer capacity (NTC) 
considering security analysis, accepts bids from potential buyers and allocates the capacity to 
the ones that value it the most (Kristiansen, 2007). Market players make bids for the needed 
NTC. The bids are stacked, with the highest first, until the NTC are completely utilized. Each 
participant has to pay a calculated “transmission market” clearing price. A player who has 
been allocated capacity is not obliged to use it, but a principle of “use-it or lose-it” should be 
used. The unused capacity will therefore be opened up for all players. The explicit auction is 
often a joint coordinated mechanism between the concerned TSOs, and includes different 
products with varying frequency (i.e. year, month or day). 
 
Implicit auction considers energy bids in each organized market area, and based on 
submitted bids, supply and demand in the market areas are matched. Unlike an explicit 
auction, the allocation of capacity is here included in the auctions of electricity in the market. 
When the implicit auction method is used, the capacity between bid areas is available for all 
players, in addition the bid and offers in each area are known. The area prices would therefore 
reflect the cost of energy in each area and the cost of congestion.   
 
 
Figure 2.3  Market based congestion management methods (Kristiansen, 2007) 
 
Market splitting and market coupling are the two marked based solutions where implicit 
auctions are used.  
When a market splitting method is used, a centralized power exchange (PEX) is split into 
geographical bid areas with limited exchange capacities (Androcec & Wangensteen, 2006). A 
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single system price is calculated based on the total demand and generation in the whole 
market area. When a congested line is expected, a bid area on each side of the transmission 
line is defined each having its own pool price. The price in the surplus region is lower than the 
price in the deficit region, and the power should flow from the low price area over in the area 
with a higher pool price. This congestion management method is an optimal solution 
regarding utilization of the defined capacity in the grid, where the market players will decide 
the physical flow and whether congestions would appear. This method has been used with 
great success in the Nordic region, and has now been implemented in the Iberian market as 
well.  
The principle of market coupling is somewhat the same as the market splitting method, the 
capacity should be utilized with power flowing from a low price area/region towards a high 
price area/region. The difference here is the cooperation between two or more power 
exchanges.  
There are several practical barriers to applying implicit auction in the EU region, the method 
requires a well organized electricity market. Between nations there might be different physical 
agreements and exchange trading agreements. Market coupling have however recently been 
successfully introduced between France, Belgium and The Netherlands. And on the horizon 
several other market coupling projects are under way, including the CWE (France, Belgium, 
The Netherlands and Germany) coupling and the first inter regional coupling EMCC between 
the Nordic region and Germany. 
 
 
2.3.3 Non market based solutions 
 
As can be told from the name, these solutions do not give correct economic signals from a 
market based viewpoint. Although some of these methods are still used at different cross-
border sections, most of them should become obsolete or be altered towards a market based 
solution in the future. The solutions discussed here can be seen in Figure 2.4, followed by a 
short description of each method.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4  Non market based congestion management methods (Kristiansen, 2007) 
 
Access limitation is a congestion management tool used for DC interconnectors with 
ownership that differs from the linked network. This method does not give any efficient cross 
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border economic signal for generation/transmission investment (ETSO, 2004). And no pan 
European incentive for social welfare maximization and least-cost operation is given. A few 
users may retain benefits from this method.  
 
For the Priority list method (or First come, first served), the marketer gets capacity in a 
priority order until the whole available transfer capacity (ATC) is allocated. The criteria used 
are often based on chronological order, and past use of capacity. The problem with this 
approach is the possibility of long-term reservations blocking the transmission capacities. 
Other characteristics for the method are (ETSO, 2004): 
 
- Transparency limited by confidentiality of trade 
- The market players obtaining capacity capture congestion rent and pay a 
capacity price which usually is very low or zero.  
- The method favors exporters or importers with large portfolios of 
customers. 
 
When using the Pro-rata rationing method, capacities are allocated in proportions to 
requests if they exceed the announced ATC. This allocation method is transparent and non-
discriminatory. But the characteristics of this method could possible promote gaming tactics 
from players in the market, if a player anticipates that a congestion would occur it may 
possibly overestimate their capacities needs and purchase accordingly. These gaming-tactics 
can be avoided by making the players oblige to use the designated capacity. 
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2.4 European Power Markets  
 
In the process of integrating the electricity market in Europe, a number of power exchanges 
have evolved. A few words on the basics behind a power exchange are shared, followed by a 
brief overview of the existing exchanges. 
 
2.4.1 The exchange 
 
The basic idea of a power exchange is the possibility of having a centralized and transparent 
market place where competitive trading can take place, and where market participants can 
accurately monitor the market price. Most power exchanges originated as auction-based spot 
markets, reflecting market participants need to optimize day-ahead scheduling decisions in the 
delivery of a non-storable commodity over an integrated transmission network (OMEL, 
Annual Report , 2007).  The exchanges have however, with increasingly competition in the 
power market, evolved into a more traditional role of exchange including standardized and 
freely tradable power derivatives. 
 
Spot market trade at a power exchange is completed the day before delivery. This is done in 
order to allow both market participants and system operator a reasonable timeframe for 
arranging physical aspects of the delivery.  
 
The spot market in the Nordic region calculates the price as the balance between bids and 
offers from all market participants, i.e. the intersection point between the markets supply 
curve and demand curve. This method is often referred to as equilibrium point trading, 
auction trading, or simultaneous price setting (NordPool, The Elspot market, 2008). In a 
situation with market splitting, the mechanism of the spot market trade adjusts the flow of 
power across interconnectors in the grid accordingly the capacities set by the TSOs. And thus 
works as an implicit capacity auction on the interconnectors between the bidding areas.  
 
Trading in electricity derivatives is a cost-effective, liquid and convenient method for 
participants to manage their price delivery of electricity. When trading in the derivative 
market the settlement and delivery are carried out as financial price hedging settlements 
without any physical delivery of electricity (Solem, 2003). 
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2.4.2 European power exchanges 
 
An overview of the current power exchanges in Europe can be seen in Figure 2.5 followed by 
a short description of a selected few exchanges.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5  Power exchanges in Europe (EEX & Powernext, 2008) 
 
 
Nord Pool 
 
A power exchange does not need to be limited by national borders, an example of this is the 
Nord Pool exchange, which is a collaboration between four Nordic countries. The exchange is 
the largest physical and financial power exchange in Europe, and organizes the physical trade 
of electricity in the Nordic region and the KONTEK area in Germany.  
 
Nord Pool also provides a market place where participants can trade derivative contracts in 
the financial market
2
. The duration of the contracts vary from days, weeks, months, quarters 
and years, with the longest contract reaching 6 years of length.  
 
Turnover in the financial market at Nord Pool increased with 38,3 % from 2006 (765,9 TWh) 
to 2007 (1059,9 TWh). The traded volume at the spot market increased from 249,8 TWh in 
2006 to 290,6 TWh in 2007, an increase of 16,3% (NordPool, Key Figures, 2008).  
                                                 
2
 The Nordic derivative products are owned by Nord Pool ASA. All international contracts are owed by 
NASDAQ OMX Commodities. 
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Nord Pool has currently over 420 members in total, including exchange members, clearing 
clients, members and representatives in 22 countries (NordPool, About Nord Pool, 2009) 
 
 
EEX3 
 
The European Energy Exchange (EEX) emerged as a result of a merger between LPX Leipzig 
Power Exchange and the Frankfurt-based EEX in 2002. Since then it has evolved into the 
leading power exchange at the continental part of Europe. EEX offers opportunities for 
trading in the spot market (day ahead and intraday) and electricity derivatives. The derivatives 
have a maturity of up to six years. 
 
Since EEXs inception in 2002, the volume for the power spot market has increased from 
31,45 TWh in 2002, to 154,4 TWh in 2008. The increase in the traded spot volume displayed 
a particularly good development recently with an increase of 24,8 % from 2007 to 2008. The 
trade volume on the power derivative market increased at the same time from 1150 TWh in 
2007 to 1165 TWh in 2008
4
.  
 
As of January 2009, EEX has 218 trading participants from 19 countries (EEX, European 
Energy Exchange, 2009).  
 
 
IPEX 
 
The Italian power exchange (IPEX) was launched in 2004 and marked the start of the first 
regulated electricity market in Italy. The exchange is organized and managed by Gestore del 
Mercato Elettrico S.p.A (GME) and enables producers, consumers and wholesale customers 
to enter into electricity purchase and sale contracts. The exchange consists of the spot market, 
MPE, (day ahead, adjustment market and ancillary service market) and the forward electricity 
market, MTE. The tradable forwards consist of Base-Load and Peak-Load contracts, with 
daily, weekly and monthly delivery periods. 
 
From the launch in 2004, the exchange volume (both MPE and MTE) increased from 231,5 
TWh in 2004 to 336,0 TWh in 2008. The liquidity in the same period increased from 29,1% 
in 2004 to 69% in 2008. As of January 2009 there are 149 market participants listed at the 
exchange.(GME, Summary Data, 2009).  
  
                                                 
3
 On September 19, 2008 EEX and Powernext announced the incorporation of the new Spot Trading Company 
under the name EPEX Spot SE – European Power Exchange (EEX & Powernext, Press Release, 2008).  
4
 The volume for derivatives trading also comprises 887 TWh from OTC clearing (EEX, Press release , 2009) 
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Powernext5 
 
Powernext was launched in July 2001 as a direct response to the opening up of the European 
electricity markets, and is the French power exchange for spot (day ahead and intraday) and 
future trading. The exchange offers derivatives in form of power futures with maturity up to 3 
years. 
 
The volume traded on the Powernext exchange increased from 2,6 TWh in 2002 to 44,2 TWh 
in 2007 (Rademaekers, Slingenberg, & Mosy, 2008). The exchange had 80 trading members 
in January 2009.  
 
 
APX and BELPEX 
 
The Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) was established in 1999 as an independent exchange 
for anonymous trading on the spot market offering market participants a spot market trading 
platform in the form of day-ahead transactions (APX, 2008). The exchange provides markets 
for short term trading (no derivatives
6
) in the Netherlands (APX Power NL), the United 
Kingdom (APX Power UK) and Belgium.  
 
In November 2008 the second anniversary of the Trilateral Market Coupling (TLC) was 
celebrated. This market coupling was initiated by APX in 2004, and set into action two years 
later. The TLC is linking the Belgian, Dutch and French electricity markets closer together.  
 
The APX Power NL exchange had a traded volume of 24,9 TWh in 2008, this is an 19% 
increase from 2007 and is the highest ever traded volume on the APX NL exchange. The 
number of participants on the exchange was 56 by the end of 2008.  
 
The Belgian power exchange BELPEX was introduced simultaneously as the market coupling 
was introduced in 2006. The exchange provides short term power trades through the day-
ahead market segment, through a continuous day-ahead market segment and a continuous 
intraday market segment (BELPEX, 2008). BELPEX does not currently offer any derivatives 
products.  
 
In BELPEXs first full year of service, the exchange reached a total trade volume of 7,5 TWh, 
and by the end of the same year counted 24 members.   
 
  
                                                 
5
 See footnote number 2 
6
 As per 12 December 2008, ENDEX, the Amsterdam-based European Energy Derivatives Exchange, is part of 
APX Group. ENDEX offers trading and clearing services for power and natural gas futures (APX, APX 
Continues to grow, 2008) 
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OMEL and OMIP 
 
Spain`s operator for the power market is OMEL, which is responsible for the technical 
management of the national power system. OMEL offers daily trading in The Iberian 
Electricity Market (Mercado Iberico de Electriciade, MIBEL). The futures market is 
organized by OMIP, which is the managing entity responsible for the organization of the 
Portuguese division of MIBEL. Throughout 2008 the traded volume in the daily market at 
OMEL was 266 TWh. (OMEL, Market Results, 2009). Per January 2009, OMIP had 30 
participants.  
 
 
2.4.3 OTC trading in the power market 
 
Over-the-Counter (OTC) trading occurs when players trade power directly between 
themselves and not through an exchange. These trades are often managed by large brokerage 
firms, and the method thus involves the use of a decentralized market approach. There are no 
centralized exchanges for these trades, and the trades are often referred to happen in the “OTC 
market”. Unlike trades on an exchange is OTC trades not logged and published, the trades are 
a deal between the involved players and the broker used. This leads to limited price 
transparency, limited liquidity, an ex ante restricted number of potential market partners and 
often substantial transaction costs (Rademaekers, Slingenberg, & Mosy, 2008).  
 
This limited transparency makes it difficult to accurately estimate the size of the OTC market, 
but it is obviously the preferred method for power trading in Europe. This can be confirmed 
by estimates from (Fortis, 2008) which suggest that the volume of OTC trades in the EEX 
region during 2007 was twice the size that was traded at the exchange.  
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2.5 Market development 
 
The agenda of the European Commission has been to create a single electricity market in 
Europe. The market development in terms of congestion management, price development and 
market integration is briefly commented in the following sections. 
 
2.5.1 Congestion management 
 
It is important to promote market based solution on congestion management as this would 
enable an economic value being placed to the product being traded, i.e. transmission capacity. 
A non market based method would work in an environment with no competition, but in a fully 
competitive market cross border exchanges should be managed under market rules.  
 
The Regulation 1228/2003/EC requires that market based solutions are adopted for congestion 
management. Methods other than implicit and explicit auction should therefore be less 
common in the future. It should however be mentioned that explicit auctions have one major 
disadvantage as they do not allow the netting of imports and exports, this is a requirement of 
the Regulation 1228/2003/EC.  
 
Some work has recently been done to a Flow-based Market Coupling (FMC) solution. 
According to the ETSO-EuroPEX Joint Working Group, this method meets the needs of both 
the market and system operation. The result is a model with regional price areas, with inter-
regional trading facilitated by market coupling subject to simplified transmission constraints. 
The model describes arrangements for day-ahead trading (EuroPEX, 2004). The model can be 
seen as a compromise between the market splitting approach and the more detailed Locational 
Marginal Pricing (LMP) method used in the PJM-area in the US. The method might be a 
possible solution in a future single electricity market across Europe (Gerd Solem, 2007) 
 
A flow-based allocation scheme is a supra-national approach, where all bids for energy and 
the related cross-border capacity are optimized by a centralized entity that is responsible of 
the allocation. The flow-based solution could be a promising approach as the commercial 
transactions are no longer limited to the interconnections where they are reported, but instead 
converted into physical power flows using a simplified network representation. Impacts on 
third interconnections can thus be considered in order to ensure overall security (Energy 
Community Secretariat, 2007). 
 
 At the moment, no flow based capacity allocation mechanism is implemented in Europe. 
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2.5.2 Market Prices  
 
A good indicator to measure the efficiency and integration level of the power market is the 
market price development at the different exchanges. In Figure 2.5.1 the price variation from 
February 2008 until January 2009 can be seen. The prices at the various exchanges are 
somewhat correlative, the prices seems to be following the same price trends with a price top 
during September 2008 and a bottom during may 2008. There is however very large volatility 
at some exchanges, this is especially true for the APX, EEX, Powernext and GME exchanges. 
It is very interesting to see the low price volatility at the Nord Pool and OMEL-E exchanges. 
These markets are based on implicit auctions with market splitting, and it is somewhat clear 
that this could be a preferred solution as a future congestion management method at the 
continent.  
 
Even with the relatively large volatility in prices at some of the exchanges, the correlative 
nature of the prices indicates that the market has reached some degree of efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6  Price development at various power exchanges during 2008 (OMEL, 2009) 
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2.5.3 Regional markets 
 
The development of potential regional markets has been proposed as a necessary interim stage 
in the integration process. An overview of possible regional markets was introduced by the 
European Commission in 2004, see Figure 2.7. As can be seen from this figure, the 
Commission expected 8 regional markets to develop by 2009. Including the already well 
established Nordic marked. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Strategy by the European Commission, year 2004 (European Commission, 2004) 
 
 
Since this time, an additional three regional markets have successfully developed. The TLC 
market between Belgium, The Netherlands and France was launched in 2006, while the 
Iberian market (MIBEL) was opened in 2007. In addition to these three, has an intraregional 
market become operational in Central Eastern Europe, where coordinated explicit auction is 
utilized.  
 
Further plans involving regional market development includes a market coupling in Central 
Western Europe, namely between France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany. This 
regional market is planned for launch during the first quarter of 2009 (Zecchini, 2008).  A 
coupling between the Nordic market and Germany is also underway, this project is 
undertaken by The European Market Coupling Company (EMCC). The coupling was initially 
launched in September 2008 but was suspended later the same year due to unexpected 
deviations in power flow and price. The coupling is planned for re-launch during first quarter 
of 2009 (EMCC, 2008).  
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3. PRICING MECHANISM 
 
In this chapter some principles regarding pricing mechanism in an electricity market is 
discussed, the example is valid for a situation where market splitting is used to create different 
price areas
7
. But first let us take a look at what makes the electricity market somewhat 
different than other commodity markets. 
 
3.1 Properties of the electricity market 
 
Electricity is essential to the community, the society depends on electricity and it is taken for 
granted that power is available at all times. Technical characteristics of the power supply can 
however lead to a breakdown, and it is estimated that the price on loss of power sometimes 
can cost society over 100 times higher than ordinary price of electricity (Wangensteen, 2007). 
 
Electricity differs from most products in several aspects. As discussed in (McDermott & 
Peterson, 2002) is there bound to be some volatility in the power market. Supply and demand 
varies during the day, week and year. This combined with the fact that electricity cannot be 
stored, at least not in a large scale efficient way, will lead to fluctuation in the market.   
 
It is a common fact that upgrade or investment in new generation capacity in the power grid 
could be a time consuming and expensive task. The same can be said for the transmission 
grid, where the consequence at times with high load could be insufficient transmission 
capacity.  Lack of transmission capacity can create constraints in the grid, which in turn could 
increase market power for participants when regions are separated.   
 
Another factor that increases the concerns regarding market power is the rather inelastic 
demand for electricity. This means that variation in the price of electricity has little effect on a 
consumers demand for electricity.   
 
As for the transmission and distribution of electricity, the industry is considered to be 
naturally monopolistic.   
 
The electricity system can overall be regarded as a very complex system, where instant 
balance in production and consumption is essential. The need for instant balance in the system 
makes a real time price mechanism practically impossible, hence the pricing of the market 
needs to be done ex ante or ex post. In the following sections, a discussion of the price 
formation in the electricity market is done.  
 
  
                                                 
7
 With an underlying assumption of perfect foresight and perfect competition, the dispatch outcomes for the 
explicit auction are identical to those of the implicit auction. Price outcomes and welfare   distribution are also 
identical in the two cases (CONSENTEC, 2004).  
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3.2 Pricing mechanism and congestion management 
 
3.2.1 Socio economic welfare 
 
Let’s first take a look at the pricing mechanism in a perfectively competitive market, and how 
social welfare can be identified by a simple approach.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Producer and consumer surplus in optimal market environment (Wangensteen, 2007) 
 
Figure 3.1 show a standard supply and demand curve in a liberalized market environment, the 
intersection between these curves is the equilibrium of the market, in other words the point 
where the marginal cost equals the marginal willingness to pay a price 𝑝0 at volume 𝑥0. When 
this intersection is located, the producer and consumer surplus can be identified. The shaded 
area between the demand curve D and the price 𝑝0 is the consumer surplus, while the 
producer surplus is the shaded area between the supply curve S and the price 𝑝0. The socio 
economic welfare is defined as the product of these two areas.  
 
3.2.2 A simple example8 
 
The following section tries to clarify how the pricing mechanism works in an environment 
where constraints in the transmission capacity have lead to market splitting
9
.  
 
No interconnection  
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, we start with two areas with different supply and demand 
properties which lead to two independent area prices. In relation to each other the area A is a 
surplus area, while area B is a deficit area. This can be identified by the price difference 
between the cases. The socio economic welfare has already been defined, and in this situation 
the total surplus for both areas are 32 500 NOK.  
 
                                                 
8
 The data for this example is provided by (Wangensteen, 2007). 
9
 For simplicity the example here involves two areas. Market splitting can however certainly involve more than 
two areas which would increase the complexity of the pricing mechanism. 
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Figure 3.2 Demand and supply curves for the two areas (Wangensteen, 2007) 
  
Furthermore let us analyze what would happened if these two areas where connected via a 
unconstrained transmission line. As can be seen from Figure 3.3, the market now has one 
demand curve and one supply curve, and acts as one integrated market. What happened to the 
socio economic surplus? Well the total surplus sums up to a total of 35000 NOK, which 
means that the integration of the market has a value of 2500 NOK.   
 
 
Figure 3.3 Supply and demand curves for the integrated market (Wangensteen, 2007) 
 
Impact of transmission capacity constraints 
 
The capacity of the transmission line used to connect the two areas in the above was assumed 
to be unconstrained. If the transmission line connecting the areas was congested this would 
have impact on the prices in the areas. For the surplus area (A) the price will be reduced, for 
the deficit area (B) the price will increase. As a consequence of this alternation in prices, 
consumers in area A would increase their benefit, and producers in the same region would 
experience a reduction in surplus and vice versa for area B. The system operator in the market 
would receive a profit in form of congestion rent from the market players. Overall the benefit 
in form of socio economic consequence to society would be reduced. 
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The situation with a constrained transmission line can be illustrated in Figure 3.4. The surplus 
line (A) is found when subtracting supply from demand in area A, while the deficit line (B) is 
found by subtracting demand from supply in area B. The required transmission capacity 
between the two areas can be located in the intersection point from the supply and demand 
lines. This is the transmission capacity which is needed in order to avoid congestion. The 
congestion rent received by the TSO(s) involved is found by multiplying the price difference 
between the two areas with the capacity of the transmission line. In the figure this rent is 
represented by the square. Furthermore the welfare gain for the market participants can be 
seen, which together with the congestion rent represents the socio economic welfare to society 
is. The welfare loss when transmission capacity is less than 100 MW is also represented in the 
figure.  
 
Figure 3.4 Welfare gain/loss and congestion rent in a situation with constrained  
  tranmssion capacity (Wangensteen, 2007) 
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4. INTER-TSO COMPENSATION  
 
With the introduction of Regulation 1228/2003/EC the European Commission aimed at 
setting fair rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity. This included the establishment of 
a compensation mechanism for cross-border trade, the Inter-Transmission System Operator 
Compensation (ITC) mechanism. The Regulation is presented in this chapter, followed by a 
short discussion. Later some criteria for a compensation scheme are discussed.  
 
 
4.1  The ITC framework 
 
The ITC mechanism plays an important role in the development of the internal electricity 
market. In a liberalized electricity market, power should flow across national borders as easy 
as it would flow within borders. Meaning market participants all across the network could be 
involved in cross-border trades. The cross-border flows from these trades have an impact on 
foreign networks, and would lead to increased costs for TSOs. The idea behind the ITC 
scheme is that these costs should be compensated for. With this being done, there should in 
reality be no extra cost involved with cross-border trades and the market would be more in 
line with the European Commission’s definition of a single market.  
 
The framework for the compensation mechanism is given in Article 3 of Regulation 
1228/2003/EC, and is quoted bellow: 
 
 
 
1.  Transmission system operators shall receive compensation for costs 
incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows of electricity on their 
networks. 
 
2. The compensation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be paid by the operators 
of national transmission systems from which cross-border flows originate 
and the systems where those flows end. 
 
3.  Compensation payments shall be made on a regular basis with regard to a 
given period of time in the past. Ex-post adjustments of compensation paid 
shall be made where necessary to reflect costs actually incurred. The first 
period of time for which compensation payments shall be made shall be 
determined in the guidelines referred to in Article 8. 
 
4.  Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 13(2), the 
Commission shall decide on the amounts of compensation payments 
payable. 
 
5.  The magnitude of cross-border flows hosted and the magnitude of cross-
border flows designated as originating and/or ending in national 
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transmission systems shall be determined on the basis of the physical flows 
of electricity actually measured in a given period of time.  
 
6. The costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows shall be 
established on the basis of the forward looking long-run average 
incremental costs, taking into account losses, investment in new 
infrastructure, and an appropriate proportion of the cost of existing 
infrastructure, as far as infrastructure is used for the transmission of cross-
border flows, in particular taking into account the need to guarantee 
security of supply. When establishing the costs incurred, recognized 
standard-costing methodologies shall be used. Benefits that a network 
incurs as a result of hosting cross-border flows shall be taken into account 
to reduce the compensation received. 
  
(European Commission, 2003b) 
 
 
Transit as defined in Regulation 1228/2003/EC: 
„Declared transit' of electricity means a circumstance where a „declared export' 
of electricity occurs and where the nominated path for the transaction involves a 
country in which neither the dispatch nor the simultaneous corresponding take-up 
of the electricity will take place. 
 
(European Commission, 2003b) 
 
 
4.2 Comments to the framework 
 
The inter-TSO compensation framework set forth in Article 3 of Regulation 1228/2003/EC 
aims to compensate infrastructure and network losses for TSOs affected by transits. The 
framework has however been criticized for having some vague definitions relating to the rule 
set.  
Paragraph 1 and 2 in the article states TSOs hosting cross-border flows should be 
compensated for by those TSOs cross-border flows originate and ends. This seems like a 
reasonable statement, but there is one problem, the path of a power flow in an electricity 
network is based on physical laws and is dependent on transmission lines impedances.   
Let us assume there has been a bilateral trade agreement between a producer in France and a 
consumer in The Netherlands, one would assume that the path of the energy would go straight 
north through Belgium. Most of this energy will actually follow this path, but certainly not all. 
Some of the energy would possibly flow through the German transmission lines and thus 
create loop flows (cf. section 5.3) between these countries. This could create a dilemma, 
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because of the physical laws, a declared transit flow would not correspond to an actual 
bilateral contract.  
Paragraph 5 in the article suggests the use of national borders in case of measuring of cross-
border flows. It can however be discussed whether national borders/TSO-regions are the right 
terms to use when defining the origin and end of cross-border flows, since these flows are so 
difficult to map. Another reason for why national borders should not be the part of the 
measuring of cross-border flows is the fact that the smaller a country is, the larger will 
generally the ratio of transits to internal consumption become. Smaller countries will therefore 
in general have a larger fraction of their horizontal networks attributable to external users. 
Research proves that a smaller country is more prone to experience larger effects of inter-TSO 
payments than larger countries (COMILLAS, 2002). 
It is stated in paragraph 6 that “benefits that a network incurs as a result of hosting cross-
border flows shall be taken into account to reduce the compensation received”. There is 
however no clear definition of what benefit is.  
The benefit concept is further discussed in section 5.2.  
 
 
4.3 General properties for a cost allocation method 
 
As can be seen from the framework above is the objective of the ITC compensation scheme 
quite general, and thus makes it a challenge to create sound solution. There are however some 
properties that are essential in this process.  
 
 
An ITC model should comply with the rules of physics, and therefore be accurate in terms of 
cost reflectivity. From the discussion above the identification of cross-border flows can be 
challenging, therefore a load flow algorithm should be the desired method for this task.  
 
According to the Regulation 1228/2003/EC should the ITC mechanism determine costs that 
results from hosting cross-border flows. Some ITC models define compensation based on 
transit flows, which per definition
10
 can lead to less sensible results. For example would a 
country with export on all transmission lines be defined to not have transits, and shall thus not 
receive any compensation. The same goes for a country with import on all lines. An ITC 
model using the transit definition is therefore lacking accuracy compared to a model which do 
not use the transit term in the allocation calculation
11
. 
 
                                                 
10
 ETSO defines transit as the minimum between total import and total export of a county, i.e.  
Min ( 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡) 
11
 An example can be the Average Participation and the Marginal Participation methods, which detects the 
responsibilities of flow on network elements on node levels in order to explicitly consider flows (not only 
transits) between neighboring countries (COMILLAS, 2002). 
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An additional way of increasing accuracy for an ITC model is to consider a variety of load 
flow situations throughout the year. This is important since load flow pattern will vary during 
day, week and month.  
 
Transparency is also essential when dealing with ITC models. An allocation method should 
produce results that are trusted, and trusted results depend on the transparency and how easy 
the model is to comprehend.  
 
Benefits should also be included in a future ITC mechanism, not only benefits related to the 
physical conditions in the grid. As pointed out in (Gerd Solem, 2007) could countries buy at a 
low price at one side of the border, and sell at a higher price on the other side and this way 
create a benefit.   
 
   
4.4 Voluntary agreement 
 
Although the ITC concept was introduced with the 1228/2003 Regulation, work on a 
compensation scheme regarding cross-border trade already begun in 2002, when eight 
members of the ETSO (Association of European Transmission System Operators) signed the 
first voluntary compensation agreement (ETSO, 2002).  
 
Since then there has been a number of suggested compensation methods, and a range of 
analyses have been done in order to find a suitable method that is in line with the Regulation. 
Some of these methods are; With-and-Without Transit (WWT), Average Participations (AP), 
Marginal Participations (MP) and Improved Model for Infrastructure Cost Allocation 
(IMICA).  
 
The latest signed agreement for 2008/09 is based on the principle applied for the Interim ITC 
Agreement June – December 2007, where losses are based on the WWT model, i.e. losses are 
calculated based on a scenario with transit and a scenario without transit and then compared 
(for details see section 6.1). According to this agreement all ITC participants get fully 
compensated for losses caused by transit flows. They will also get compensation for 
infrastructure cost, in addition to this will the model allow less volatility, and hence guarantee 
stable ex post net results (ETSO, 2007).  
 
The agreement has so far been signed by 39 European TSOs, and thus covers all the EU 
members and a number of non-EU countries including; Norway, Switzerland and the South 
East European countries; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Montenegro 
and Serbia.  
 
Within a two year period, ETSO assumes that a new and technically improved ITC 
mechanism should be ready. This ITC model will solve some issues not yet addressed in the 
current mechanism.   
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5. TRANSIT AND CROSS-BORDER FLOW 
 
In this chapter some characteristics concerning transit and cross-border flows are discussed. 
First off is a discussion on the relationship between ITC and tariff regulation. In addition to 
this are some benefits and costs regarding cross-border flows discussed, as well as a short 
description of investment incentives followed by some comments regarding loop flows.   
5.1 Tariff Regulation and ITC 
 
There are basically two types of tariff regulation schemes in use throughout Europe, the first 
category include the traditional cost-of-service
12
 (COS) regulation, which basically means that 
cost and revenue for each TSOs should balance. The second category of regulation schemes is 
known as incentive based regulation
13
. The characteristics behind this method imply that the 
regulator delegates certain pricing decisions to the firm (in this case the TSOs), which can 
reap profit increases from cost reduction (Vogelsang, 2002).  
 
The following discussion
14
 is based on the cost-of-return regulation (COS). It is assumed that 
the TSO is a state owned monopoly, with tariff systems and revenue regulations in line with 
the current practice in the Nordic region. The TSO is assumed to have maximization of social 
welfare as its economic objective, limited to the TSOs own control area (which in the Nordic 
region means the national borders). 
 
The balance between cost and revenue when using a COS regulation can be expressed as: 
 
Fixed cost + Variable cost + (ITC) = Residual element + Variable element 
 
5.1.1 Cost elements 
 
Cost = Fixed cost + Variable cost + (ITC) 
 
The fixed cost is based on investments already done, which include the operation and 
maintenance cost added with the capital cost. The variable cost includes two more elements, 
grid losses and loss of load.  
 
Variable cost = grid losses + loss of load 
 
The grid losses are assumed to be compensated for by the TSO purchase in the market, and 
thus imply a cost for the TSO. Loss of load is defined as losses imposed on grid customers 
because of outages, which could present a cost to society. ITC is here included on the cost 
side of the balance. If a TSO is allocated compensation due to ITC, the element will be 
negative, and vice versa if the TSO have to pay.    
 
                                                 
12
 Also known as cost-plus, or rate of return regulation (ROR) 
13
 Known as performance based regulation in the U.S. 
14
 The discussion is based on an example given in (Gerd Solem, 2007) 
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5.1.2 Revenue elements 
 
Revenue = Residual element + Variable element 
 
The revenue is basically defined as revenue from grid users, and as seen above split into two 
elements. The variable element reflects the short term marginal cost for grid usage, and is 
therefore dependent on load, losses and congestion.  
 
Variable element = Congestion rent +marginal loss factor 
 
When a situation where congestion occurs, the TSO receives revenue
15
 which sums up as the 
price difference between the two areas involved multiplied with the transferred power. The 
losses are represented by a marginal loss factor. The residual element and the residual cost 
should be in balance, this is however usually not the case when regarding electricity networks. 
Therefore a residual element has to be added on the revenue side to cover the costs. The 
element should not affect grid customers operational decisions (Gerd Solem, 2007).  
 
 
5.1.3 ITC and TSO profit 
 
Let us investigate how the transit compensation scheme affects the elements in the COS 
regulation.  
 
 
Fixed cost  - Not affected by ITC, the fixed cost is based on investments  
    already done. 
 
Variable cost  - Supposed to be unaffected. 
 
Variable element - Supposed to be unaffected. The variable element represents a 
    correct short term price signal to the grid customers and  
    therefore reflects optimal trading patterns and optimal flow 
    when the market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. This 
    element should thus not be affected by ITC since this would 
    prevent optimality.  
 
Residual element - Will be affected. 
 
As can be seen will the compensation either given or received affect the residual element in 
the COS regulation, which implies that the compensation will be passed on to the customers 
in the region. The compensation will not have impact on the TSO profit.  
  
                                                 
15
 This is congestion rent, which have been discussed earlier in the report 
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5.2 General benefits and costs 
 
5.2.1 Cross-border trade 
 
There are bound to be benefits involved with cross-border trade, but participants involved 
might also experience a cost, although would the benefits most likely outweigh the costs. If 
this was not the case, then cross-border transactions would not make economic sense. Some 
of the benefits and costs fundamentals are discussed in this section.  
 
One obvious benefit from increased cross-border exchange is the improved security of supply 
for the involved TSOs. 
 
Another benefit that could occur from cross-border trade and which is part of the security of 
supply element is the sharing of reserves. The benefit of sharing reserves refers to avoided 
investment in various types of reserve capacity. Sharing of reserves was one of the principles 
utilized in 2002-2003 when Nordic countries had an energy deficiency (N-H. v der Fehr, 
2005). The value of shared reserves might be compared to the cost of increasing peak 
capacity.  
 
Benefits in form of operational security increases a power systems overall ability to supply 
electricity without interruptions and is also a part of the security of supply element. 
Operational security is therefore an important benefit concerning cross-border exchange. A 
power grid supported by exchange agreements between TSOs will certainly be better 
equipped to handle sudden failures.  
A well integrated power system with high cross-border trade utilization would imply large 
regulation capacity and make the frequency increasingly stable. The extra regulation capacity 
would be a benefit if an interruption occurs. 
 
From a market perspective would an increase in cross-border trade lead to a more efficient 
market, with increased competition and liquidity on the exchanges. The prices would be more 
stable, and be more in line with market participants’ supply and demand.  
 
But there can also be costly disadvantages regarding cross-border trade. There can be a risk of 
cascade disconnections within a large network if interruptions are not replaced with normal 
operation condition within a certain time frame. This would indeed be a substantial cost to 
society, in form of loss of power. As already mentioned before in the report is the cost of lost 
power suggested to be over 200 times the normal price.  
 
Security of supply and stability in the network could also be affected in a negative manner 
when extreme imports and exports occur.  
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5.2.2 Transit 
 
Transit flows is part of the cross-border term, and occurs when more than two parts are 
involved in cross-border exchange. The cost and benefits of transit flows in large networks are 
difficult if not impossible to locate without utilizing a transit compensation allocation 
mechanism. The principles can however be fully identified using a simple example
16
.  
 
Figure 5.1 show two networks where transit flows are identified in Country B. When 
considering the above network in the figure, and assuming the level of investment is given, 
the consequences of transit in Country B compared to a no transit situation would be: Higher 
losses in the local grid, and slightly higher security of supply which will result in a decrease in 
loss of load. Overall the cost will increase for Country B. 
 
When ignoring the ITC allocation, Country B would increase its revenue. This happens 
because of two factors, internal and external customers. The revenue from these customers 
increase as the difference in price p2 and price p3 rises. The reason behind this is related to 
the internal transfer in Country B. Revenue from external customers and internal customers 
scale with the internal flow and external sources.  In addition to this will there be revenue 
originating from the price difference between p1 and p2, p3 and p4.  
 
 
Country A
p1
Country B
p2          p3 
Country C
p4
Country A
p1
Country C
p4
Country B
p2          p3 
 
Figure 5.1 Example of transit flows through Country B 
 
 
From the lower network in the figure can it be seen that the transit flow in the opposite 
direction than the previously mentioned example. The losses in Country B will be lower. The 
income from the tariff element is lowered because of the decreasing price difference between 
node 2 and node 1. This tariff element is reduced more than the cost of losses. However will 
there be net revenue in Country B as long as the direction of the power flow is from Country 
A to Country C.  
  
                                                 
16
 Based on a discussion in (Gerd Solem, 2007) 
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5.3 Investment incentives 
 
The following section tries to identify what impact cross-border flows and transits can have 
on investment incentives in an interconnected electricity network.  
 
5.3.1 Individual incentive 
 
An example
17
 is illustrated in Figure 5.1, and involves three countries with different market 
prices. It is assumed that the three countries are fully competitive markets. As indicated in the 
figure will the power flow go from Country A (which is a surplus region) via Country B and 
finally end up in country C (who is a deficit region). It is then assumed that a local investment 
in Country B allows a greater flow from the low price country to the high price country. This 
would have an effect on the wholesale prices in the countries: 
 
Country A
Price = Low
Country B
Price = Medium
Country C
Price = High
 
Figure 5.2 Example of interconnector flow 
 
Country A: Prices would increase with the increased export, and the wholesale market 
  would experience increased demand, thus requiring additional generation.  
Country B: Prices would be the same as before (assumed that net import from country A 
  and net export to country C evens out). 
Country C: Prices would be reduced as a result of the cheaper electricity flow from country 
A via   country B. 
If ignoring ITC compensation and congestion rent, it would be clear that country B would 
incur the additional infrastructure cost in its transmission charges. The benefits and costs 
would be divided between the participants as followed:  
Country A: The price increase would benefit producers, and be a cost for consumers. 
Country B: Here the prices stay the same, but due to the increased transmission charges, 
  consumers would experience higher costs. 
Country C: The decline in price would be a cost for producers and benefit consumers. 
If this increased transmission capacity in Country B would provide a net welfare increase, the 
investment should be undertaken. But in this situation the net welfare in Country B would 
                                                 
17
 Based on a example given in (Economics, 2008) 
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drop, as customers are experiencing increased transmission charges for no corresponding 
benefit. Because of this could the investment quite possible be disapproved by the regulator in 
country B due to the interest of its customers.  
Individual incentives is therefore not always in line with the overall welfare of a power 
system, however was transit compensation and congestion rent ignored in the example.  
 
5.3.2 Congestion rent incentive 
 
If the investment in Country B was done on a merchant by merchant basis, the increased 
congestion rent on the cross–border lines due to the investment should be allocated to Country 
B (if not all, at least most of it). This might however be a difficult task in a well meshed 
network, where the required negotiating between the participants might be complicated. Even 
in the three country example here could this prove to be challenging. Bilateral congestion rent 
arrangements is based on subjective analysis, and would in some situation give investments 
incentives, but most cases this would not be the case.  
 
5.3.3 ITC incentive 
 
If it was assumed that transit was defined as the minimum of total exports and total imports 
Country B would be the winner in the three country scenario. The payers would in this 
situation be Country A and Country C. The increase in ITC compensation (when assuming 
COS regulation) would lead to a benefit for the grid customers in Country B, while customers 
in Country A and C would experience increased costs. This is not a “fair” situation, and could 
possible distort the market efficiency as participants in Country A and C would restrain from 
initiating cross-borders trades because of the extra cost it involves. In this example ITC 
allocation could have a misleading result in form of a less efficient market. 
 
 
 
What is important in regards to the transit compensation and congestion rents is that these 
mechanisms make the incentive analysis complex and possible subjective, and it is not a 
certainty that the investment incentive problem could be addressed with an ITC allocation 
model. 
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5.4 Loop Flow and transit 
 
 
The Regulation 1228/2003/EC states that the compensation mechanism shall be based on 
cross-border flows. In many situations can loop flows basically be defined as cross-border 
flows, and should thus be included in a compensation mechanism. It has been discussed how 
well ITC methods include loop flows in the compensation calculations (ERU, 2006), as these 
methods often only accounts for commercial transit flows as a result of reference exchange. 
Calculation based on reference flows are simplifications of real flows which can distort the 
results, and does not take loop flows into account. For countries hosting huge loop flows, the 
result might be congested transmission lines and limited possibility for cross-border 
exchange. A simplified example on the relationship between transit and loop flows can be 
seen in Figure 5.2.  
 
Country A Country B Country C
Country D
 
Figure 5.3 Loop flows in a network 
 
In this situation it is assumed that a bilateral power exchange trade between Country B and 
Country C is active. The grey arrow in the figure indicates that Country B buys power from 
Country C. One would assume that the power flow would take the shortest physical route 
between these countries, but as already mentioned is the power flow direction in an electricity 
network determined by the transmission lines and its impedances. In this case the traded 
power takes a detour via Country D and Country A before it reaches its destination (marked 
by the red arrows). Even though the bilateral trade initially only involved Country B and C, 
Country D and A became involved because of loop flows.  
Since the physical flow pattern is determined by the characteristics of the network, one would 
assume that the actual loss of this loop flow pattern would be less than the shortest route. 
As already mentioned is the definition and discussion of loop flows closely connected to 
power transit, in this situation the third part (i.e. Country A and D) should be compensated. It 
has been suggested from parties that the ITC mechanism should include loop flow factors in 
order to solve these types of problems.  
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6. THEORY 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the basic theory of the ITC allocation mechanism included 
in the report. In addition to this the characteristics of the 11-node power grid model is 
discussed. A description of the optimal power flow (OPF) method and how nodal prices can 
be identified is also included.  
 
 
6.1 Model for ITC allocation  
 
With and Without Transit  
 
The With and Without Transit (WWT) allocation method is based on a principle where a load 
flow situation including transit flows, are compared to a fictive situation where the transit 
flows are removed. This way transit can be located as cross-border flows not related to the 
activity of the agents within the analyzed region.  
The definition of transit can be approached in various ways. The definition adopted by ETSO 
is often used, where transit is defined as the minimum between the total hourly flow in the 
import direction and the total hourly flow in the export direction (Regulation, 2005). If this 
definition is being used, transits can be identified by the following rules: 
 
Net importing region 
 
In a net importing region the transit is defined as export flow. In addition to this is a fraction 
of the import flow defined as transit as well. This fraction is obtained by dividing the total 
export from the region by the total import into the region. This fraction of transit is also 
removed when simulating the “without” scenario.  
Net exporting region  
For a net importing region, the transit can be found the opposite way. Transit is in this area 
defined as import flow. In addition to this is a fraction of the export flow defined as transit as 
well. This fraction is obtained by dividing the total import into the region by the total export 
out of the region. This fraction of transit is also removed when simulating the “without” 
scenario.  
 
In order to quantify how much transit flows use the network of the considered TSO area, the 
network usage attributable to the transit has to be computed. There seems to be several ways 
to do this, one is discussed in (L. Olmos I. P.-A., 2006) and involves defining a global 
measure of network usage MW x km, and then comparing this amount in the two situations. 
This is the method used in this report. 
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For identification of allocation of costs, the WWT algorithm gives no answer. As discussed in 
(L. Olmos I. P.-A., 2006) is there no way of identifying which regions have to contribute to 
the compensation due to another region and to what extent each of them must  contribute to 
this compensation.  
 
Some rules regarding allocation of the compensation have however been proposed by the 
ETSO. Their set of rules proposes that the total compensation fund is computed by adding 
compensation due to all regions. The contributing to this fund should be allocated on the basis 
of each regions responsibility in generating cross-border/transit flows, where the proxy used 
to quantify the responsibility is based on the net import or export flow of each region (L. 
Olmos I. P.-A., 2007). 
 
A mathematical of the WWT method is here given
18
: 
 
An increase in line flows within a region 𝑐 that is believed to occur due to transit through the 
region in scenario 𝑒 can be expressed as (1). 
 
∆𝜑𝑐,𝑒
−𝑡 = 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑐 ,𝑒 ∙  ∆𝐼𝑐 ,𝑒
−𝑡   (1) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑐 ,𝑒  is the Power Transfer Distribution Factors matrix of line flows in country c 
with respect to net power imports at the cross border lines in scenario e. ∆𝐼𝑐 ,𝑒
−𝑡  is the vector of 
net power imports at cross-border lines in region c that are due to the transit through the 
simulated region in scenario e. 
 
 
Global usage of the grid within region c that is caused by transit through this region is 
expressed as (2). 
 
∆𝑁𝑈𝑐
𝑡 =   (𝐿𝑐 ∙ ∆𝜑𝑐 ,𝑒
−𝑡)𝑒   (2) 
 
Here 𝐿𝑐a vector expressing the length of the transmission lines within region c. 
 
 
Thus the compensation region c is entitled can be expressed as (3). 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐 = 𝑅𝐺𝐶𝑐
∆𝑁𝑈𝑐
𝑡
𝑁𝑈𝑐
0    (3) 
 
𝑅𝐺𝐶𝑐  is the total regulated annual cost of the grid, region c, and 𝑁𝑈𝑐
0is the total usage made 
of the grid by the same region.  
 
  
                                                 
18
 Based on description given in (L. Olmos I. P.-A., 2007) 
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The total size of the global compensation fund is expressed as (4). 
 
𝐶𝐹 =  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑗𝑗    (4) 
 
 
And contribution of each region c to the global compensation fund is obtained using (5). 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑐
𝐶𝐹 = 𝐶𝐹 ∙
𝜃∙𝐼𝑐
 𝜃∙𝐼𝑗𝑗
   (5) 
 
Here 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑐
𝐶𝐹  is the contribution of region c to the global fund, 𝜃 is a vector that describes the 
number of cross-border nodes in the corresponding region, and  𝐼𝑗  is a vector describing the 
net power imports at the cross-border lines in region j.  
 
 
The compensation received by region c can finally be computed (6). 
 
𝑁𝐶𝑐 = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐 − 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑐
𝐶𝐹   (6) 
 
Additional information about the calculation of ITC compensation using the With-and-
Without method is given in chapter 7.  
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6.2 11-node grid 
 
The simulations done in this report are all based on the 11-node grid example used in (R. D. 
Christie, 2000), although in order to include losses in the analysis, a full AC model is used 
instead of the original model. The example grid consists of 11 nodes located in 4 different 
regions, with one TSO associated to each of the regions. 
 
The original grid system can be seen in Figure 6.1. Line data for the base case scenario can be 
found in Table 6.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Base case grid (R. D. Christie, 2000) 
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Branch From bus To bus Line resistance 
(p.u.) 
Line reactance 
(p.u.) 
Transmission capacity 
(MW) 
1 1 2 0.008 0.08 2000 
2 1 3 0.010 0.10 1600 
3 2 3 0.064 0.64 250 
4 2 4 0.004 0.04 3000 
5 2 5 0.016 0.16 1000 
6 3 8 0.016 0.16 1000 
7 3 9 0.040 0.40 400 
8 4 5 0.008 0.08 2000 
9 4 6 0.008 0.08 2000 
10 4 7 0.004 0.04 3000 
11 5 7 0.012 0.12 2000 
12 6 7 0.016 0.16 2000 
13 8 10 0.012 0.12 1600 
14 8 9 0.016 0.16 1000 
15 9 10 0.032 0.32 500 
16 6 11 0.012 0.12 1500 
17 7 11 0.016 0.16 1200 
18 10 11 0.032 0.32 500 
Table 6.1 Line data for the base case 
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6.3 Optimal Power Flow and Nodal Prices 
 
6.3.1 Generator costs 
 
The objective in OPF analysis is to minimize generator operation costs. The generator cost 
can be represented as quadratic functions (8), 
 
𝐶𝑖 𝑃𝐺𝑖 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 × 𝑃𝐺𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 × 𝑃𝐺𝑖
2   (8) 
 
with 𝑃𝐺𝑖  as the produced power, and a, b and c being constants. These constants imply that the 
marginal cost is a linear function of output. 
 
 
6.3.2 Nodal Prices and the point-tariff system 
 
The nodal prices can be identified utilizing an OPF simulation, in addition to this can the 
active and reactive power generated and purchased at each node be located. The nodal prices 
would in this case reflect the marginal generation and load at each node, and represent the 
optimal prices. These prices will maximize social welfare, and would adjust to transmission 
constraints.  
 
A nodal pricing system is normally defined as a system based on central dispatch. The 
dispatch center receives bids from all generating and consuming units and performs an 
optimization leading to an optimal dispatch. This would lead to a set of nodal prices 
representing the value of a marginal quantity at that node (Gerd Solem, 2007). It is here 
assumed that this optimal condition is reached using a point tariff system. 
 
If a point tariff system is used, there would be a link between the spot price referring to a 
specific hub (𝑝𝑠), the nodal price () and the variable elements of the point tariff (a). This 
would give the following relationship for input in node i (9). 
 
 
𝜆𝑖 = 𝑝𝑠 − 𝛼𝑖     (9) 
 
 
With no congestion, 𝛼𝑖  would be the marginal loss between node i and the hub. 
Output in node j would give (10), 
 
 
𝜆𝑗 = 𝑝𝑠 − 𝛼𝑗     (10) 
 
where 𝛼𝑗  would be the marginal loss between the hub and node j.  
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This would give the difference between nodal prices at the output and the input node (11), 

𝜆𝑗 − 𝜆𝑖 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖   (11)
 
with 𝛼𝑗𝑖 as the marginal loss between i and j. The impact of congestion in the system can be 
included in the variable element in the tariff (𝛼𝑖and 𝛼𝑗 ). 
 
The location of the reference hub has an impact on the spot price and the tariffs, but no impact 
on the net revenue of the grid users (Wangensteen, 2007). But this relationship is only valid as 
long as one TSO is involved. In a system consisting of more than one TSO, the net revenue 
would depend on the reference hub. This is the case for the system used here.   
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7. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
In this chapter some simulations are done in order to investigate how ITC allocation is 
affected by implementing a bottleneck in the grid. The With-and-Without transit method has 
been used in calculating the results. A description of this method was given in chapter 6, but 
the method is further commented in this section along with the results of the calculation.  
7.1 Impact of a bottleneck  
7.1.1 Base case 
 
The network which is analyzed can be seen in Figure 7.1
19
. The network is represented by 
four TSOs in four different regions. A load flow calculation has been done in order to identify 
export and import flows as well as internal flows.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Base Case scenario with load flows 
 
                                                 
19
 The flows in the figure are only approximately correct in the figure, the following calculation is however 
utilized with exact values. 
41 
 
There are several methods for allocating compensation costs when using the WWT method, 
the one used here determines the total utilization of the HN in both scenarios, with and 
without transit, and the compares the utilization attributed to external flows. The fictional 
without scenario has to be solved using a load flow model
20
. When both scenarios are 
compared, the TSOs compensation (12) can be identified as a proportion of the total cost of 
the HN where the factor of proportionality is represented by the ratio between the utilization 
of the total cost of the HN attributable to external flows, and the total (actual) utilization of 
the HN (Regulation, 2005). These compensations can be added up for each TSO, and the total 
compensation pool can be obtained.  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐻𝑁𝑖)
𝑈− 𝑈𝑤𝑡
𝑈
   (12) 
 
 
The TSO compensation is represented by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖  , the network utilization with transit is 
represented by U, and network utilization in the without scenario is represented by 𝑈𝑤𝑡 . The 
cost component for the horizontal network 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐻𝑁𝑖) is neglected, as it is assumed that the 
cost factor is identical in all regions.  
 
The formula listed in (12) is similar to formula (5) listed before, and would produce the same 
answer.   
 
In order to identify the compensation allocation using the WWT method, one scenario with 
transit flows and one scenario without transit flows has to be simulated for each region that 
are defined to have transit flows within their local network. The definition of transit used in 
this report is identical to the once adopted by ETSO, i.e. the minimum between total import 
and total export.  
 
Calculation of compensation Region 1 
 
Table 7.1 show the network utilization of the HN in Region 1, the utilization is found by 
multiplying the flow over each line with the length of the line. The power flow is identified 
using MATPOWER. For simplicity the length of each internal line is set to 100 km, while the 
length of the cross-border lines is set to 200 km, these lengths are valid for all calculations 
done on the 11-node model. 
  
                                                 
20
 The model used in this report is Matpower (MATPOWER, 2008) 
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 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)  (MWkm) 
Line  1 2  Internal  100  242,05  24205 
Line  1 3  Internal  100  257,95  25795 
Line  2 3  Internal  100  10,06  1006 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  332,32  66464 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  158,10  31620 
Line  3 8  Cross-border 200  118,11  23622 
Line  3 9  Cross-border 200  126,64  25328 
           
Total utilization          198040 
Table 7.1 Network utlization Region 1 Base case, with transit 
 
When the network utilization in the transit scenario are found, the same has to be done to the 
scenario where tranit flows are removed. In Region 1 import is defined as transit flows, this 
can easily been seen from Figure 7.1. In addiditon to this is a fraction of the export flows also 
defined to be transit flow, so this fraction has to be removed before the without scenario can 
be simulated. This fraction is calculated as (13). 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
 (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑜𝑟  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 )
    (13) 
 
In othre words is the transit divided by export if the transit is defined as import and vice versa 
if transit is defined as export. When this fraction along with the rest of the transit flows are 
removed, the numbers in Table 7.2 can be found. Notice that the flow on the cross-border 
lines 3-8 and 3-9 are nulled out because of transit. In addition to this has the transit fraction 
been deducted from the exporting line 2-4 and 2-5.  
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)  (MWkm) 
Line  1 2  Internal  100  45,93  4593 
Line  1 3  Internal  100  454,07  45407 
Line  2 3  Internal  100  65,39  6539 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  171,34  34268 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  81,51  16302 
Line  3 8  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
Line  3 9  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
           
Total utilization          107109 
Table 7.2 Network utlization Region 1 Base case , without transit 
The network utilization in the without scenario, is lower than in the original scenario. The 
difference between these numbers is the increased usage of the grid caused by transit, Table 
7.3. 
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Increased usage of the grid caused by transit 90931 
      
Compensation entitled   0,459155 
Table 7.3 Compensation due to Region 1, Base case 
Entitled compensation can be found using formula (12) or (5). 
 
 
Calculation of compensation Region 2 
 
A similar approach is being used for each region where transit flows can be identified. Results 
from Region 2 can be seen in Table 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6. 
 
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)  (MWkm) 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  332,32  66464 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  158,10  31620 
Line  4 5  Internal  100  150,14  15014 
Line  4 6  Internal  100  308,70  30870 
Line  4 7  Internal  100  642,02  64202 
Line  5 7  Internal  100  114,00  11400 
Line  6 7  Internal  100  6,17  617 
Line  6 11  Cross-border 200  32,42  6484 
Line  7 11  Cross-border 200  18,13  3626 
           
Total utilization          230297 
Table 7.4 Network utlization Region 2 Base case , without transit 
 
The network utilization in Region 2 can be seen in Table 7.4, and 7.5. The difference between 
the utilization in the two scenarios is significantly lower than it was for Region 1.  
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)  (MWkm) 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  298,04  59608 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  142,05  28410 
Line  4 5  Internal  100  154,64  15464 
Line  4 6  Internal  100  288,06  28806 
Line  4 7  Internal  100  626,47  62647 
Line  5 7  Internal  100  105,78  10578 
Line  6 7  Internal  100  12,60  1260 
Line  6 11  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
Line  7 11  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
           
Total utilization          206773 
Table 7.5 Network utlization Region 2 Base case , without transit 
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Table 7.6 Compensation due to Region 1, Base case 
 
Table 7.6, show that the entitled compensation for Region 2 is lower than for Region 1.  
 
Calculation of compensation Region 3 and Region 4 
 
As can be seen from Figure 7.1, are Region 3 and Region 4 regions where transit flows cannot 
be identified. Region 3 has only export flows on its cross-border lines, and opposite has 
Region 4 only import flows on its lines. These regions will therefore not receive any 
compensation, but they are not excluded from the compensation mechanism, and do have to 
contribute to the compensation pool.  
 
  
Increased usage of the grid caused by transit 23524 
      
Compensation entitled   0,102146 
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Contribution to the compensation pool 
 
Table 7.7 show the compensation allocation between TSOs. The compensation due between 
the TSOs is calculated using formula (5) and (6).  A minus sign means that the given 
TSO/Region would be a net contributor to the compensation pool. The use by other row 
represents the use of the grid of the corresponding country by others, while the use of others 
row represents use that the country makes of others grid.  
 
 
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 
Region 1   - 0,016487 0 0 
Region 2  0,132692  - 0 0 
Region 3  0,155468 0,034586  - 0 
Region 4  0,096885 0,021554 0  - 
Use by others 0,385045 0,072627 0 0 
Use of others 0,016487 0,132692 0,190054 0,118439 
      
Net use   0,368558 -0,06007 -0,19005 -0,11844 
      
Compensation [ %] 100 -16,2974 -51,5669 -32,1356 
Table 7.7 Contribution to the compesation pool, base case  
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7.1.2 Bottleneck 
 
The calculation of compensation allocation between the TSOs is done for an example where a 
bottleneck is implemented, and is done in a similar fashion to the section above. From Figure 
7.2 can it be seen that a bottleneck has been implemented between node 2 and node 5 in the 
network. This is done in order to investigate what the consequences would be for the 
compensation allocation.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Bottleneck scenario including load flows 
 
Detailed results from the bottleneck example can be found in the Appendix 2. The overview 
of the compensation allocation is however listed here, as these results are used for comparison 
between the two cases.  
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Contribution to the compensation pool 
 
The allocation of contribution to the compensation pool can be seen in Table 7.8. Region 3 
and 4 are still not receiving any compensation from the pool, compensation entitled has in 
numbers increased for Region 1 and Region 2, while Region 3 and Region 4 experience 
higher ITC costs due to the bottleneck. The results are further commented in chapter 7.3.  
 
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 
Region 1  -  0,020555 0 0 
Region 2  0,094583  - 0 0 
Region 3  0,199687 0,092808  - 0 
Region 4  0,149329 0,069404 0 - 
Use by others 0,443599 0,182766 0 0 
Use of others 0,020555 0,094583 0,292495 0,218733 
      
Net use   0,423044 0,088183 -0,29249 -0,21873 
      
Compensation [ %] 82,75067 17,24933 -57,2142 -42,7858 
Table 7.8 Contribution to the compesation pool, Bottleneck case  
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7.2 Additional cross-border transmission line 
 
A new 400 MW cross-border line has been introduced between node 5 and node 8 in the grid. 
The new flow pattern can be seen in Figure 7.3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Additional 400 MW cross-border line scenario including load flows 
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Contribution to the compensation pool 
 
As can be seen from the Table 7.9, will there in this scenario be no compensation for Region 
3 and Region 4. The new transmission line is connected to on of the nodes in Region 3, 
however is it clear from the load flow simulation that there will be export on this line as well. 
And thus would there be no transit in Region 3. The flow pattern is unchanged for Region 4, 
who is importing on all cross-border lines.  
 
Table 7.9 Contribution to the compesation pool, additional cross-border line  
 
  
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 
Region 1    0,028067 0 0 
Region 2  0,123447   0 0 
Region 3  0,118674 0,037654   0 
Region 4  0,118116 0,037477 0   
Use by others 0,360237 0,103198 0 0 
Use of others 0,028067 0,123447 0,156328 0,155594 
      
Net use   0,33217 -0,02025 -0,15633 -0,15559 
      
Compensation [ %] 100 -6,0959 -47,0626 -46,8415 
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7.3 Summing up results 
 
The results from the three simulation cases are here brought together and compared for a short 
discussion.  
 
7.3.1 Bottleneck scenario 
 
Cost allocation of having a bottleneck in the grid between node 2 and node 5                              [%] 
    
Region 1   0,00 
Region 2   0,00 
Region 3   50,53 
Region 4   49,47 
Table 7.10 Allocation of the extra ITC cost when having a bottleneck in the grid 
 
The numbers in Figure 7.10 indicate how the increased ITC cost of having a bottleneck 
between node 2 and node 5 will be allocated. It can easily be read that the regions not 
physically involved with the bottleneck (i.e. region 3 and Region 4) is affected in a negative 
manner. The increased ITC cost as a consequence of the bottleneck is split almost evenly 
between these two regions. The two neighbouring regions involved with the bottleneck have 
no cost from this scenario, in fact they profit from the restrained cross-border line. A 
comparison between the Base Case and the Bottleneck Case can be seen in Table 7.11. 
 
 Base Case Bottleneck Difference 
    
Region 1 0,37 0,42 0,05 
Region 2 -0,06 0,09 0,15 
Region 3 -0,19 -0,29 -0,10 
Region 4 -0,12 -0,22 -0,10 
Table 7.11 Comparison between Base Case and Bottleneck 
 
From an incentive perspective, this would indicate that the TSOs in Region 1 and Region 2 
would certainly not actively try to avoid congestions on this line, as the bottleneck proves to 
be a benefit for the customers in these respective regions in form of a reduced residual 
element (assuming COS tariff regulation). The customers in these regions could experience 
decreased security of supply as a consequence of reduced cross-border transmissions, but one 
would assume that this effect could be neglected compared to the benefit from increased ITC 
payment.  
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ITC compensation would probably only be a minor part of TSOs total revenue, extensive 
research has to be done in order to identify this relationship but this is outside the scope of the 
report.  
 
7.3.2 Additional cross-border line 
 
Allocation of the cost of investing in a cross-border new line between node 5 and node 8           [%] 
    
Region 1   49,5 
Region 2   0,0 
Region 3   0,0 
Region 4   50,5 
Table 7.12 Allocation of the cost when investing in a new cross-border line  
 
If investment in an additional cross-border line between node 5 and node 8 is done, the 
regions will be affected as seen in Table 7.12 and Table 7.13. The increased cross-border 
capacity between these nodes would have a negative impact on the ITC allocation for Region 
1 and Region 4, i.e. the regions not involved with the investment. On the other side would 
Region 2 and Region 3, who are the neighbouring regions to the transmission line experience 
a positive effect in form of increased ITC payment. It should be noticed that the overall size 
of the ITC allocation pool will decrease when this investment is done. Because of the 
increased cross-border flow between Region 2 and Region 3, benefits in form of increased 
security of supply would emerge for these two regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.13 Comparison between Base Case and Extra Line 
 
 
In this case the investment incentive given by the ITC allocation mechanism is in line with the 
idea of an increasingly integrated market. The investment incentive should, as already 
mentioned before not be based on individual incentives, but rather be based on an overall 
increase in the social benefits, if this is the case here is however uncertain.   
 
 Base Case Extra Line Difference 
    
Region 1 0,37 0,33 -0,04 
Region 2 -0,06 -0,02 0,04 
Region 3 -0,19 -0,16 0,03 
Region 4 -0,12 -0,16 -0,04 
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It seems like the ITC mechanism gives split investment incentives in these two scenarios, in 
the scenario with the bottleneck there is an incentive to restrain transmission investments, 
whereas in the second scenario the opposite is true.  
 
 
7.3.3 Potential weakness in the simulation 
 
There will always be a chance of potential weaknesses in simulations which may lead to 
misleading results, and the simulation done in this report is no exception.  
 
First off is the 11-node network model used for simulations not a very large model, and small 
changes in the network properties might have large impacts on the results. In a larger model 
such modifications would probably have less impact on single results.  
 
Some assumptions have also been done in order to simplify the simulation. The length of the 
internal lines in the network are all identical, so is the cross-border lines, in addition to this 
was the network cost neglected as it was assumed that the cost factors were the same in all 
four regions.  
 
These simplifications, and the fact that the model only consist of 11-nodes must be taken into 
account when analyzing the results.  
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8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Market development  
 
With an increasingly focus on liberalizing the European electricity market the European 
Commission introduced the Directive 2003/54/EC and the Regulation 1228/2003/EC in 2003. 
The Commissions agenda has since then brought significant changes in the sector. In many of 
the European countries electricity prices are now market based and determined by supply and 
demand from the market participants. A number of exchanges have been introduced 
throughout Europe and liquidity on the exchanges has generally increased.  
The European electricity market is however still developing and there is a long way to go 
before the Internal Electricity Market (IEM) will be a reality. There are significant differences 
in the legislation between countries and a variety of congestion management methods are 
being used. Even though there seems to be a shift towards market based solutions, some non-
market based congestion management methods are still in use.  
The development of the Internal Electricity Market will require further harmonization and 
coordination of market rules and operations throughout Europe. There has been positive 
development in some regions, especially the Nordic region, the CWE region (i.e. the trilateral 
market coupling between France, Belgium and The Netherlands) and in the Iberian market. 
This is in line with the European Commissions agenda of promoting a regional strategy as an 
interim step stone towards a single European electricity market.  
When trying to sum up this development it is important to understand how it 
started and how ambiguous the idea of an Internal Electricity M arket actually 
is. The market has developed in the right direction, but the road ahead is a 
long and narrow one.   
 
8.2 Evaluation of the model 
Transit 
 
Currently the most common definition of transit is the one adopted by ETSO, which define 
transit as the minimum between exports and imports. It could be discussed if this is a 
generally suitable definition, and whether the transit term should be expanded in order to 
include economical and market principles as well. The current transit definition creates 
opportunities for participants to manipulate transit income, for example when buying at a low 
price at one side of the border and sell for a higher price at the other and thus creating transit 
flows which will alter the compensation allocation. 
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Inconsistency with the framework 
 
The Article 3, Regulation 1228/2003/EC, states that the transmission system operator shall 
receive compensation for costs inured as a result of hosting cross-border flows of electricity 
on their networks. The WWT method uses the transit definition adopted by ETSO when 
dealing with cross-border compensation. This creates a dilemma as purely importing and 
exporting countries in this case are not defined to hosting transit, and will therefore not be 
compensated. These countries also have flows that results from the impact of the activity of 
external participants, even though the flows originate or ends within the considered country. 
An ITC model should try to identify these flows and include them in the 
compensation mechanism, and the current definition of transit should not be 
used when considering cross-border compensations.   
 
According to Article 3, shall the inter-TSO compensation be paid by the operators of national 
transmission systems from which cross-border flows originate or end. The WWT method is 
not in line with the framework when identifying the responsibilities for the network use. The 
WWT method bases the charges that each country has to pay on a pro rata of the net volume 
of imports and exports, regardless of the location and distance to the considered member state 
and the flow pattern. This method for identifying network responsibilities could be 
considered rational as it is true that net imports and exports is one of the 
reason for external utilization of networks, but it is certainly not the only one.   
 
The ITC model used for simulation in this report does not include important benefits that 
could occur from cross-border flows. As stated in Article 3, should the benefit that a network 
incurs as a result of hosting cross-border flows be taken into account and reduce the 
compensation received. Benefits that should be included may for example be 
increased security of supply and reduced loss of load.   
 
Transit and investment Incentives  
 
The result from the bottleneck scenario suggests that the neighbouring TSOs would 
experience reduced ITC payment. The TSOs would in other words not be given investment 
incentives through the ITC mechanism. A correct incentive to invest in increased transmission 
capacity should be based on welfare gain, i.e. the economic benefit to society. Investment in 
the grid might not benefit the involved TSO, but the consequences of increased transmission 
capacity would probably be more efficient utilization of the network. And the value of this 
increased efficiency would most likely be larger than the benefit the TSO would receive if it 
did not expand its grid. The investment could in other words increase the economic benefit to 
society (although this is only an assumption and whether or not the investment would lead to 
increased social benefit to society is not analyzed in the simulation).  
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A TSO should therefore be careful when considering ITC payment in investments analysis as 
this could very well prove to not reflect the optimal solution to society in general. 
 
The results from the additional cross-border line scenario is however somewhat different, the 
TSOs involved (Region 2 and Region 3) would in this case be positively affected in terms of 
ITC allocation (notice that the two TSOs still are net contributors to the allocation pool, the 
amount has however decreased). In this case the TSOs would be given an incentive to invest 
in increased transmission capacity. This investment incentive would be in line with the 
framework given by the European Commission, and contribute to an increasingly efficient 
market.   
 
It can be concluded that the inconsistent ITC results identified in the se two 
scenarios indicate that the ITC mechanism (in this case  represented by the 
WWT model) cannot be regarded as relevant from an inves tment incentive 
perspective.  
 
Further work 
 
An interesting topic for further research on the ITC concept would be to investigate what 
impact this mechanism has on the actual revenue for the different TSOs. In other words if the 
compensation size would be large enough to be part of an investment analysis.  
It should also be investigated how the total socio economic benefit is affected by ITC 
allocation, this way a more accurate analysis of the investment incentive dilemma could be 
done.   
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APPENDIX 1 – ABBREVATIONS 
 
 
AP  - Average Participation 
 
APX  - Amsterdam Power Exchange 
 
ATC  - Available Transfer Capacity 
 
BELPEX - Belgian Power Exchange 
 
COS  - Cost-of-Service 
 
EEX  - European Energy Exchange 
 
ETSO  - Association of European Transmission System Operators  
 
FMC  - Flow-based Market Coupling 
 
HN  - Horizontal Network 
 
IEM  - Internal Energy Market 
 
IMICA - Improved Model for Infrastructure Cost Allocation 
 
ITC  - Inter-TSO Compensation 
LMP  - Locational Marginal Pricing  
 
MP  - Marginal Participation 
 
NTC  - Net Transfer Capacity 
 
OPF  - Optimal Power Flow 
 
OTC  - Over-the-Counter market 
 
PEX  - Power Exchange 
 
TLC  - Trilateral Coupling 
 
TPA  - Third Party Access 
TSO  - Transmission System Operator 
 
WWT  - With-and-Without Transit  
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APPENDIX 2 – ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS 
 
A2.1 Bottleneck scenario calculations 
 
Detailed results from the bottleneck calculation can be found in this section. 
 
Calculation of compensation Region 1 
 
Table A.1, show the network utilization for Region 1 when transit flows are included. When 
the transits are removed, a new load flow simulation is done and these results can be seen in 
Table A.2. The increased utilization of the grid due to transit flows can be seen in Table A.3, 
and from this the compensation entitled to Region 1 in the bottleneck case can be found.  
 
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  1 2  Internal  100  199,21  19921 
Line  1 3  Internal  100  300,79  30079 
Line  2 3  Internal  100  22,17  2217 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  233,01  46602 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  49,97  9994 
Line  3 8  Cross-border 200  80,81  16162 
Line  3 9  Cross-border 200  108,77  21754 
           
Total utilization          146729 
Table A.1 Network utlization Region 1 Bottleneck case, with transit 
 
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  1 2  Internal  100  45,93  4593 
Line  1 3  Internal  100  454,07  45407 
Line  2 3  Internal  100  65,39  6539 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  76,61  15322 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  16,45  3290 
Line  3 8  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
Line  3 9  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
           
Total utilization          75151 
Table A.2 Network utlization Region 1 Bottleneck case, without transit 
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Increased usage of the grid caused by transit 71578 
      
Compensation entitled   0,487824 
Table A.3 Compensation due to Region 1, Bottleneck case 
 
Calculation of compensation Region 2 
 
The same procedure is repeated for Region 2, here the results from the simulation with transit 
flows can be seen in Table A.4. The results when simulating without transit flows is found in 
Table A.5, while the entitled compensation is shown in Table A.6. 
 
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  233,01  46602 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  49,97  9994 
Line  4 5  Internal  100  83,17  8317 
Line  4 6  Internal  100  307,38  30738 
Line  4 7  Internal  100  607,64  60764 
Line  5 7  Internal  100  147,11  14711 
Line  6 7  Internal  100  1,78  178 
Line  6 11  Cross-border 200  46,54  9308 
Line  7 11  Cross-border 200  36,69  7338 
           
Total utilization          187950 
Table A.4 Network utlization Region 2 Bottleneck case, with transit 
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  162,41  32482 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  35,25  7050 
Line  4 5  Internal  100  59,63  5963 
Line  4 6  Internal  100  280,20  28020 
Line  4 7  Internal  100  567,23  56723 
Line  5 7  Internal  100  149,29  14929 
Line  6 7  Internal  100  1,70  170 
Line  6 11  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
Line  7 11  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
           
Total Utilization          145337 
Table A.5 Network utlization Region 2 Bottleneck case, without transit 
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Increased usage of the grid caused by transit 42613 
      
Compensation entitled   0,226725 
Table A.6 Compensation due to Region 2, Bottleneck case 
 
Calculation of compensation Region 3 and 4 
 
Transit is as already mentioned the minimum between total exports, out of a region/country 
and total import flow into a region/country. Because of this, Region 3 and Region 4 are not 
entitled any compensation from the ITC fund. These regions have either only import or only 
export flows on their interconnections.  
 
 
A2.2 Additional cross-border line scenario calculations 
 
The results from simulating an investment in an extra transmission line between node 5 and 
node 8 can be found in this section.  
 
Calculation of compensation Region 1 
 
For Region 1, the results when simulating network utilization including transit flows can be 
found in table A.7. The simulation without transits is seen in Table A.8. While the 
compensation entitled is found in Table A.9.  
 
 
Table A.7 Network utlization Region 1 extra cross-border line case case, with transit 
 
 
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  1 2  Internal  100  226,69  22669 
Line  1 3  Internal  100  273,31  27331 
Line  2 3  Internal  100  14,40  1440 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  321,73  64346 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  143,07  28614 
Line  3 8  Cross-border 200  99,71  19942 
Line  3 9  Cross-border 200  125,45  25090 
           
Total utilization          189432 
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 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  1 2  Internal  100  45,93  4593 
Line  1 3  Internal  100  454,07  45407 
Line  2 3  Internal  100  65,39  6539 
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  165,57  33114 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  73,91  14782 
Line  3 8  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
Line  3 9  Cross-border 200  0,00  0 
           
Total utilization          104435 
Table A.8 Network utlization Region 1 extra cross-border line case, without transit 
 
 
Increased usage of the grid caused by transit 84997 
      
Compensation entitled   0,448694 
Table A.9 Compensation due to Region 1, extra cross-border line case 
 
Calculation of compensation Region 2 
 
Once again is the process repeated, this time within Region 2. Network utilization with and 
without transit flows can be seen in Table A.10 and Table A.11. While the compensation 
entitled Region 2 is found in Table A.12.  
 
 
 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  321,73  64346 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  143,07  28614 
Line  4 5  Internal  100  125,21  12521 
Line  4 6  Internal  100  314,07  31407 
Line  4 7  Internal  100  640,67  64067 
Line  5 7  Internal  100  130,16  13016 
Line  5 8  Cross-border 200  73,96  14792 
Line  6 7  Internal  100  3,14  314 
Line  6 11  Cross-border 200  34,03  6806 
Line  7 11  Cross-border 200  22,38  4476 
           
Total utilization          240359 
Table A.10 Network utlization Region 2 Bottleneck case, with transit 
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 From  To  Type  Length (km) P (MW)   
Line  2 4  Cross-border 200  230,57  46114 
Line  2 5  Cross-border 200  102,95  20590 
Line  4 5  Internal  100  90,40  9040 
Line  4 6  Internal  100  303,60  30360 
Line  4 7  Internal  100  612,03  61203 
Line  5 7  Internal  100  143,76  14376 
Line  5 8  Cross-border 200  53,00  10600 
Line  6 7  Internal  100  1,21  121 
Line  6 11  Cross-border 200  39,94  7988 
Line  7 11  Cross-border 200  28,74  5748 
           
Total utilization          206140 
Table A.11 Network utlization Region 2 extra cross-border line case, without transit 
 
 
 
Increased usage of the grid caused by transit 34219 
      
Compensation entitled   0,142366 
Table A.12 Compensation due to Region 2, extra cross-border line case 
 
 
Calculation of compensation Region 3 and 4 
 
There is no compensation allocated to Region 3 and Region 4 in this scenario.  
